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Abstract—The speed at which two remote parties can exchange
secret keys over a fixed-length fiber-optic cable in continuous-
variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) is currently lim-
ited by the computational complexity of post-processing algo-
rithms for key reconciliation. Multi-edge low-density parity-
check (LDPC) codes with low code rates and long block lengths
were proposed for CV-QKD, in order to extend the maximum
reconciliation distance between the two remote parties. Key
reconciliation over multiple dimensions has been shown to further
improve the error-correction performance of multi-edge LDPC
codes in CV-QKD, thereby increasing both the secret key rate
and distance. However, the computational complexity of LDPC
decoding for long block lengths on the order of 106 bits remains
a challenge. This work introduces a quasi-cyclic (QC) code
construction for multi-edge LDPC codes that is highly suitable for
hardware-accelerated decoding on a modern graphics processing
unit (GPU). When combined with an 8-dimensional reconciliation
scheme, the LDPC decoder achieves a raw decoding throughput
of 1.72Mbit/s and an information throughput of 7.16Kbit/s using
an NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 GPU at a maximum distance of
160km with a secret key rate of 4.10×10−7 bits/pulse for a rate
0.02 multi-edge code with block length of 106 bits when finite-size
effects are considered. This work extends the previous maximum
CV-QKD distance of 100km to 160km, while delivering between
1.07× and 8.03× higher decoded information throughput over
the upper bound on the secret key rate for a lossy channel.
For distances beyond 130km, the GPU decoder delivers an
information throughput between 1868× and 18790× higher
than the achievable secret key rates with a 1MHz light source. The
GPU-based QC-LDPC decoder achieves a 1.29× improvement in
throughput over the best existing GPU decoder implementation
for a rate 1/10 multi-edge LDPC code with block length of 220
bits. These results show that LDPC decoding is no longer the
computational bottleneck in long-distance CV-QKD, and that the
secret key rate remains limited only by the physical parameters
of the quantum channel and the latency of privacy amplification.
Keywords—Quantum key distribution, QKD, continuous-variable
QKD, reverse reconciliation, LDPC codes, LDPC decoding, multi-
edge LDPC codes, quasi-cyclic LDPC codes, GPU decoding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD), also referred to as quan-
tum cryptography, offers unconditional security between two
remote parties that employ one-time pad encryption to encrypt
and decrypt messages using a shared secret key, even in the
presence of an eavesdropper with infinite computing power
and mathematical genius [1]–[4]. Unlike classical cryptog-
raphy, quantum cryptography allows the two remote parties,
Alice and Bob, to detect the presence of an eavesdropper,
Eve, while also providing future-proof security against brute
force, key distillation attacks that may be enabled through
quantum computing [5]. Today’s public key exchange schemes
such as Diffie-Hellman and encryption algorithms like RSA
respectively rely on the computational hardness of solving the
discrete log problem and factoring large primes [6], [7]. Both
of these problems, however, can be solved in polynomial time
by applying Shor’s algorithm on a quantum computer [8]–[10].
While quantum computing remains speculative, QKD sys-
tems have already been realized in several commercial and
research settings worldwide [11]–[14]. Figure 1 presents two
different protocols for generating a symmetric key over a
quantum channel: (1) discrete-variable QKD (DV-QKD) where
Alice encodes her information in the polarization of single-
photon states that she sends to Bob, or (2) continuous-variable
QKD (CV-QKD) where Alice encodes her information in
the amplitude and phase quadratures of coherent states [4].
In DV-QKD, Bob uses a single-photon detector to measure
each received quantum state, while in CV-QKD, Bob uses
homodyne or heterodyne detection techniques to measure the
quadratures of light [4]. While DV-QKD has been experi-
mentally demonstrated up to a distance of 404km [15], the
cryogenic temperatures required for single-photon detection
at such extreme distances present a challenge for widespread
implementation [4]. CV-QKD systems on the other hand
can be implemented using standard, cost-effective detectors
that are routinely deployed in classical telecommunications
equipment that operates at room temperature [4]. The majority
of QKD research focuses on applications over optical fiber,
since quantum signals for both CV- and DV-QKD can be
multiplexed over classical telecommunications traffic in ex-
isting fiber-optical networks [16]–[18]. Nevertheless, there has
been recent progress in chip-based QKD, as well as free-space
and Earth-to-satellite QKD [19]–[21]. It is noted here that
quantum cryptography, i.e. QKD, differs from post-quantum
cryptography, which is an evolving area of research that studies
public-key encryption algorithms believed to be secure against
an attack by a quantum computer [22]. The discussion of post-
quantum cryptography is beyond the scope of this work.
The motivation of this work is to address the two key
challenges that remain in the practical implementation of
CV-QKD over optical fiber: (1) to extend the distance of
secure communication beyond 100km with protection against
collective Gaussian attacks, and (2) to increase the computa-
tional throughput of the key-reconciliation (error correction)
algorithm in the post-processing step such that the maxi-
mum achievable secret key rate remains limited only by the
fundamental physical parameters of the optical equipment at
long distances [23], [25], [28]. Jouguet and Kunz-Jacques
showed that Mbit/s error-correction decoding of multi-edge
low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes is achievable for dis-
tances up to 80km [25], while Huang et al. recently showed
that the distance could be extended to 100km by controlling
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Fig. 1: Information transmission over untrusted quantum channel and authenticated public channel between Alice and Bob for CV- and DV-QKD.
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Fig. 2: Throughput vs. distance of GPU-based LDPC decoders
for CV- and DV-QKD. The reported throughput is the raw GPU
throughput without code- or error-rate scaling. For CV-QKD imple-
mentations [23]–[25], the annotated values in parentheses indicate the
LDPC code code block length n, the code rate R, the reconciliation
efficiency β, and SNR of the quantum channel. For DV-QKD imple-
mentations, the annotated values indicate the block length n, code
rate R, and QBER [12], [26], [27].
excess system noise [29]. This work explores high-speed
LDPC decoding for CV-QKD beyond 100km.
A particular challenge in designing LDPC codes for such
long distances is the low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the op-
tical quantum channel, which typically operates below −15dB.
At such low SNR, high-efficiency key reconciliation can be
achieved only using low-rate codes with large block lengths
on the order of 106 bits [30], [31], where approximately 98%
of the bits are redundant parity bits that must be discarded
after error-correction decoding. Such codes require hundreds
of LDPC decoding iterations to achieve the asymptotic, near-
Shannon limit error-correction performance in order to maxi-
mize the secret key rate [25], [32]. This is in contrast to LDPC
codes employed in modern communication standards, such as
IEEE 802.11ac (Wi-Fi) and ETSI DVB-S2X, where the target
SNR is above 0dB and block lengths range from 648 bits to
64,800 bits [33], [34]. In these standards, the LDPC decoder
typically operates at 10 iterations to deliver Gbit/s decoding
throughput [35]–[37]. Long block lengths allow Alice and
Bob to generate longer secret keys, which can be used to
provide unconditional security by employing the one-time pad
encryption scheme. Shorter codes with block lengths of 105
bits, for instance, would not be suitable for low-SNR channels
beyond 100km due to their less robust error-correction perfor-
mance [32], [38]. In addition to long block-length codes, key
reconciliation over multiple dimensions has also been shown to
improve error-correction performance of multi-edge codes at
low SNR [28], thereby increasing both the secret key rate and
distance. However, the computational complexity and latency
of LDPC decoding for long block lengths on the order of 106
bits remains a challenge. Figure 2 presents a comparison of
LDPC decoding throughput versus distance for several state-
of-the-art CV- and DV-QKD implementations, illustrating that
high-throughput reconciliation at long distances is achievable
only with large block-length codes that approach the Shannon
limit with more than 90% efficiency for CV-QKD or less than
10% quantum bit error rate (QBER) for DV-QKD.
This work introduces a new, quasi-cyclic (QC) code con-
struction for multi-edge LDPC codes with block lengths on
the order of 106 bits [39], [40]. Computational acceleration is
achieved through an optimized LDPC decoder design imple-
mented on a state-of-the-art graphics processing unit (GPU).
When combined with an 8-dimensional reconciliation scheme,
the LDPC decoder achieves a raw decoding throughput of
1.72Mbit/s and an information throughput of 7.16Kbit/s using
an NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 GPU at a maximum distance
of 160km with a secret key rate of 4.10×10−7 bits/pulse when
finite-size effects are considered. The performance of this work
in comparison to previous GPU-based decoders for QKD is
plotted in Fig. 2, and discussed in greater detail in Section IV.
This work extends the previous maximum CV-QKD distance of
100km to 160km, while delivering between 1.07× and 8.03×
higher decoded information throughput over the upper bound
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on the secret key rate for a lossy channel [41]. These results
show that LDPC decoding is no longer the computational
bottleneck in long-distance CV-QKD, and that the secret key
rate remains limited only by the physical parameters of the
quantum channel and the latency of privacy amplification.
CV-QKD provides a new use case for hardware-based LDPC
codes. Over the past 15 years, research in LDPC decoder
design has primarily focused on application-specific integrated
circuit (ASIC) implementations for wireless, wireline, optical,
and non-volatile memory systems, due to the widespread adop-
tion of LDPC codes in modern communication standards [35]–
[37]. Although highly-customizable ASICs provide excellent
energy efficiency, the silicon implementation of an LDPC
decoder for long-distance CV-QKD with an LDPC code block
length of 106 bits would require significant silicon die area,
which may be prohibitively expensive to fabricate in a modern
CMOS technology node [42].
The high availability of on-chip memory and floating-point
computational precision make GPUs a highly suitable platform
for LDPC decoder implementation in long-distance CV-QKD
systems [43], [44], as opposed to ASICs or field-programmable
gate arrays (FPGAs), which suffer from limited memory, fixed-
point computational precision, high-complexity routing, and
silicon area constraints [45], [46]. Since Alice and Bob are
stationary and their communication occurs over a fixed-length
fiber-optic cable, the traditional optimization parameters of
energy efficiency and silicon chip area do not necessarily apply
since the LDPC decoder does not need to assume an integrated
circuit form factor, as in the case of a mobile hand-held device,
where power consumption is a primary concern. Furthermore,
GPUs seamlessly integrate into a post-processing computer
system, and provide increasing computational performance at
low cost with each successive architecture generation [47]. The
information throughput results presented in this work were
measured using a single GPU, however, further computational
speedup can be achieved with multiple GPUs.
The remainder of this paper focuses on the design and
implementation of high-efficiency LDPC codes for reverse
reconciliation in CV-QKD systems that operate in the low-SNR
regime at long distances. Section II presents the background
on CV-QKD. Section III introduces the application of LDPC
codes for information reconciliation in CV-QKD. Section IV
presents the GPU-based LDPC decoder design and achievable
secret key rate results with multi-dimensional reconciliation,
as well as a comparison of this work to a recently published
CV-QKD work that addresses the computational bottleneck of
post-processing algorithms.
II. BACKGROUND
In a QKD system, two remote parties, Alice and Bob, com-
municate over a private optical quantum channel, as well as
an authenticated classical public channel to generate a shared
secret key in the presence of an adversary or eavesdropper,
Eve, who may have access to both channels [2]. The security
of QKD stems from the no-cloning theorem of quantum
mechanics, which states that any observation or measurement
of the quantum channel by Eve would disturb the coherent
states transmitted from Alice to Bob [38], [48]. Since Alice and
Bob can calibrate their expected channel noise threshold for a
fixed fiber-optic transmission distance prior to being deployed
in the field, any quantum measurement by Eve would result
in a channel noise increase, at which point, the reconciliation
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Fig. 3: CV-QKD model for secret key distillation with reverse
reconciliation between Alice and Bob over a private quantum channel
and public classical channel.
error rate would increase, and Alice and Bob could choose
to terminate their communication if they suspect a man-in-
the-middle attack [28]. A typical prepare-and-measure CV-
QKD system is based on the Grosshans-Grangier 2002 (GG02)
protocol [48], which defines the following four steps presented
in Fig. 3: quantum transmission, sifting, reconciliation, and
privacy amplification. Fully secure QKD networks can be
built by designating intermediate trusted nodes [3], [4], or
through measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD)
using untrusted relay nodes in both CV- and DV-QKD [15],
[49], [50]. MDI-QKD is beyond the scope of this work,
however, it does provide a viable solution to the quantum
hacking problem by removing all detector side channels [49].
This section first provides a fundamental overview of QKD,
and then presents the mathematical framework for key recon-
ciliation using LDPC codes over multiple dimensions, with the
consideration of finite-size effects on the secret key rate.
A. Quantum Transmission and Measurement
To construct a secret key using the prepare-and-measure CV-
QKD protocol, Alice first transmits Nquantum coherent states to
Bob over an optical fiber. Each coherent state is comprised of
a pair of amplitude and phase quadrature operators, x and p, of
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the form |x+ jp〉, j = √−1. Using a quantum random number
generator, Alice prepares each coherent state by randomly
selecting her xA and pA quadrature values according to a zero-
mean Gaussian distribution with adjustable modulation vari-
ance σ2A = VAN0, where N0 represents the shot noise variance
defined by the Heisenberg inequality ∆x∆p ≥ N0 [38], [48].
Alice transmits her train of Nquantum coherent states to Bob by
modulating a light source with a pulse repetition rate frep. She
also records her selections of xA and pA for the next sifting
step, by constructing a vector, A, of length 2Nquantum, from
her Nquantum coherent state quadrature operator pairs (xA, pA),
such that A2i−1 = xAi and A2i = p
A
i for i = 1, 2, . . . , Nquantum.
As such, A = (xA1 , p
A
1 , x
A
2 , p
A
2 , . . . , x
A
Nquantum
, pANquantum) and
A ∼ N (0, σ2A). Bob randomly selects and measures either
the x or p quadrature for each incoming pulse using an
unbiased homodyne detector. Bob constructs his own vector,
B, of length Nquantum, comprised of the observed modulated
quadrature measurements, where Bi ∈ {xBi , pBi } with equal
probability. Despite the losses in the optical fiber, and the
added noise from the Bob and Eve’s detection equipment,
the xB and pB quadrature measurements can still be used
to distill a secret key following the sifting and reconciliation
(error correction) steps.
Without considering the presence of the eavesdropper (Eve),
the quantum transmission is subject to path loss, excess noise
in the single-mode fiber between Alice and Bob, the ineffi-
ciency of Bob’s homodyne detection, as well as added elec-
tronic (thermal) noise [28]. The optical experimental setup is
beyond the scope of this work, thus experimental values from
previously published works have been used to characterize the
quantum channel [38]. The excess channel noise expressed in
shot noise units is assumed to be  = 0.005, Bob’s added
electronic noise in shot noise units is chosen as Vel = 0.041,
Bob’s homodyne detector efficiency is set to η = 0.606,
and the single-mode fiber transmission loss is assumed to be
0.2dB/km, such that the transmittance of the quantum channel
is given by T = 10−αd/10, where d is the transmission
distance in kilometers and α = 0.2dB/km. The total noise
between Alice and Bob is given by χtotal = χline + χhomT , where
χline = (
1
T −1)+  is the total channel added noise referred to
the channel input, and χhom = 1+Velη −1 is the noise introduced
by the homodyne detector. The variance of Bob’s measurement
is given by σ2B = VBN0 = ηT (V + χtotal)N0. Although the
adversary (Eve) may have access to the quantum channel,
her presence is not considered in the channel characterization.
Instead, the information leaked to Eve will be considered in
the secret key rate calculation [48].
In the remaining post-processing steps of the QKD protocol,
Alice and Bob communicate over an authenticated classical
public channel, which is assumed to be noiseless and error-
free. Eve may have access to this channel, however, her
eavesdropping does not introduce additional errors [48].
B. Sifting
Following the quantum transmission step, Alice’s orig-
inal transmission vector A contains twice as many ele-
ments as Bob’s measurement vector B. In the sifting step,
Bob informs Alice which of the xB or pB quadratures he
randomly selected for each of his Nquantum element mea-
surements, such that Alice may respectively discard her
Nquantum unused xA and pA quadrature values [48]. Af-
ter sifting, Alice and Bob share correlated random se-
quences of length Nquantum, herein defined as X0 =
(X01 , X02 , . . . , X0Nquantum ) and Y0 = (Y01 , Y02 , . . . , Y0Nquantum ),
respectively, where (X0i , Y0i ), i = 1, 2, . . . , Nquantum, are
independent and identically distributed realizations of some
jointly Gaussian random variables (X0, Y0). For example,
Alice and Bob may have the following random sequences
after sifting: X0 = (xA1 , p
A
2 , p
A
3 , x
A
4 , . . . , p
A
Nquantum
) and Y0 =
(xB1 , p
B
2 , p
B
3 , x
B
4 , . . . , p
B
Nquantum
). In the following reconciliation
and privacy amplification steps, Alice and Bob apply error
correction and hashing techniques to build a secret key using
their sifted sequences of correlated quadrature measurements.
C. Reconciliation
During information reconciliation, Alice and Bob perform
the first step in building a unique secret key by: (1) encoding
a randomly-generated message using the sifted quadrature
measurements, (2) transmitting the encoded message over an
authenticated classical channel, and then (3) applying an error-
correction scheme to decode the original message [38], [51]. In
the direct reconciliation scheme, Alice generates and transmits
a random message to Bob, who then performs the error-
correction decoding based on his measured quadratures. How-
ever, previous works have shown that the transmission distance
with direct reconciliation is limited to about 15km [52]–[54],
and is thus not suitable for long-distance CV-QKD targeting
transmission distances beyond 100km [32].
The long distance problem drives the need for an alternate,
robust scheme that is capable of operating under the low-
SNR conditions of the optical channel, even in the presence
of excess noise introduced by an eavesdropper. In the reverse
reconciliation scheme, the direction of classical communica-
tion between Alice and Bob is reversed. Reverse reconciliation
achieves a higher secret key rate at longer distances in compari-
son to direct reconciliation, however, powerful error-correction
codes are still required to combat the high channel noise at
long distances without revealing unnecessary information to
Eve during the reconciliation process [28], [32], [51].
Two-way interactive error-correction protocols such as Cas-
cade or Winnow are not practical for long-distance QKD due
to the large latency and communication overhead required to
theoretically minimize the information leakage to Eve [55]–
[58]. Blind reconciliation using short block-length codes on
the order of 103 bits with low interactivity was proposed
to reduce decoding latency [26], however, the short block
length is not suitable for error-correction at low SNR. In-
stead, one-way forward error-correction implemented using
long block-length codes with iterative soft-decision decod-
ing is required to achieve efficient error-correction at low
SNR [30], [51]. Jouguet et al. recently showed that multi-
edge LDPC codes combined with a multi-dimensional reverse
reconciliation scheme can achieve near-Shannon limit error-
correction performance at long distances [28], [32]. However,
the computational complexity of LDPC decoding remains a
limitation to the maximum achievable secret key rate in a
practical QKD implementation [25]. Sections III and IV of
this work present hardware-oriented optimization techniques to
alleviate the time-intensive bottleneck of LDPC decoding for
long distance CV-QKD systems, while the remainder of this
section outlines the mathematical framework for long-distance
reverse reconciliation.
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1) Reconciliation at Long Distances: Strong error-
correction schemes do not exist for systems with both a
Gaussian input and Gaussian channel, as in the case of
CV-QKD. However, at low SNR, the maximum theoretical
secret key rate is less than 1 bit/pulse per channel use, and the
Shannon limit of the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channel approaches the limit of a binary-input AWGN
channel (BIAWGNC) [51]. This makes binary codes highly
suitable for error correction in the low-SNR regime [59],
[60], as opposed to non-binary codes, which outperform
binary codes on channels with more than 1 bit/symbol per
channel use [61]. Since binary codewords can be encoded in
the signs of Alice and Bob’s correlated sequences, X0 and
Y0, the reconciliation system can therefore be modelled as a
BIAWGNC [32].
2) Reverse Reconciliation Algorithm for BIAWGNC: A vir-
tual model of the BIAWGNC can be induced from the physical
parameters that characterize the quantum transmission [32],
where the optical fiber and homodyne detector losses are
captured in the form of a signal-to-noise ratio with respect
to the optical input signal, whose variance is normalized
based on Alice’s modulation variance VA. Assuming that the
BIAWGNC has a zero mean and noise variance of σ2Z , Z ∼N (0, σ2Z), the SNR can be expressed as s = 1/σ2Z . In order to
perform key reconciliation, Alice and Bob now construct two
new correlated Gaussian sequences from their sifted correlated
sequences X0 and Y0 of length Nquantum. Alice and Bob
first select a subset of n elements from X0 and Y0, where
n < Nquantum. Here, n is chosen to be equivalent to the LDPC
code block length. Alice and Bob then normalize their subset
of n elements by the modulation variance VA, such that Alice
and Bob now share correlated Gaussian sequences X and Y,
each of length n, where X ∼ N (0, 1), Y ∼ N (0, 1 + σ2Z),
and the property Y = X+ Z holds [32].
Bob uses a quantum random number generator to generate
a uniformly-distributed random binary sequence S of length
k, where Si ∈ {0, 1}. He then performs a computationally
inexpensive LDPC encoding operation to generate an LDPC
codeword C of length n, where Ci ∈ {0, 1}, by appending
(n − k) redundant parity bits to S based on a binary LDPC
parity-check matrix H that is also known to Alice. Eve may
also have access to H, however, the QKD security proof
still holds since Eve is assumed to have infinite mathematical
genius. Bob prepares his classical message to Alice, M, by
modulating the signs of his correlated Gaussian sequence Y
with the LDPC codeword C, such that Mi = (−1)CiYi for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The symmetry in the uniform distribution of
Bob’s random binary sequence S ensures that the transmission
of M over the authenticated classical public channel does
not reveal any additional information about the secret key to
Eve [38].
Assuming error-free transmission over the classical channel,
Alice attempts to recover Bob’s codeword using her correlated
Gaussian sequence X based on the following division opera-
tion:
Ri =
Mi
Xi
=
(−1)CiYi
Xi
=
(−1)Ci(Xi + Zi)
Xi
= (−1)Ci + (−1)Ci Zi
Xi
,
(1)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Here, Alice observes a virtual channel with
binary input (±1) and additive noise (−1)Ci ZiXi . In this case,
the division operation in the noise term represents a fading
channel, however, since Alice knows the value of each Xi, the
norm of X is revealed and the overall channel noise remains
Gaussian with zero mean and variance σ2Ni = σ
2
Z/||Xi|| for
each i = 1, 2, . . . , n [32]. Alice then attempts to reconstruct S
by applying the computationally intensive Sum-Product belief
propagation algorithm for LDPC decoding, to remove the
channel noise from her received vector R. The LDPC decoding
algorithm requires the channel noise variance σ2Ni to be known
for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n. By discarding the (n− k) parity bits
from the decoded codeword, Alice can build an estimate Sˆ of
Bob’s original binary sequence S for further post-processing
in the next privacy amplification step to asymptotically reduce
Eve’s knowledge about the secret key [48]. LDPC decoding
is successful if Sˆ = S, whereas a frame error is said to have
occurred when Sˆ 6= S.
3) Multi-Dimensional Reconciliation: Up until this point,
the discussion has assumed a 1-dimensional reconciliation
scheme in R, with ±1 binary inputs on the virtual BIAWGNC.
Leverrier et al. showed that the quantum transmission can be
extended to longer distances with proven security by employ-
ing multi-dimensional reconciliation schemes constructed from
spherical rotations in R2, R4, and R8, where the multiplication
and division operators are defined [30], [51]. These spaces are
commonly referred to as the set of complex numbers C, the
quaternions H, and the octonions O, respectively. As shown
in Eq. 1, the division and multiplication operations must be
defined for the reverse reconciliation procedure. By Hurwitz’s
theorem of composition algebras, normed division is only
defined for four finite-dimensional algebras: the real numbers
R (Rd=1), the complex numbers C (Rd=2), the quaternions
H (Rd=4), and the octonions O (Rd=8) [62]. Hence, the
remainder of this discussion considers only the d = 1, 2, 4, 8
dimensions.
The multi-dimensional approach is a further reformulation
of the reduction of the physical Gaussian channel to a virtual
BIAWGNC at low SNR. For d-dimensional reconciliation, d ∈
{1, 2, 4, 8}, each consecutive group of d quantum coherent-
state transmissions from Alice to Bob can be mapped to
the same virtual BIAWGNC. As a result, the channel noise
variance among all d virtual channels is uniform. For the d = 1
case, each Ri defined in Eq. 1 has a unique channel noise
variance defined by σ2Ni = σ
2
Z/||Xi|| for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. For
the d = 2 case, the reconciliation is performed over succes-
sive (R2i−1, R2i) pairs: (R1, R2), (R3, R4), . . . , (Rn−1, Rn),
which are constructed from the quadrature transmission of
successive (M2i−1,M2i) pairs for i = 1, 2, . . . , n/2 in Rd=2.
Similar to d = 1, each ith received value is still com-
prised of a ±1 binary input and a noise term, such that
R2i−1 = (−1)C2i−1 + N2i−1 and R2i = (−1)C2i + N2i
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n/2. While the real and imaginary noise
components, N2i−1 and N2i, are not equal, the variance of
the channel noise is uniform over both dimensions, such
that σ2N(2i−1) = σ
2
N(2i) for each (R2i−1, R2i) pair. This
can be extended to the d = 4 and d = 8 cases, where
each d-tuple of successive Ri values has a unique channel
noise for each dimensional component, but the channel noise
variance remains equal over all d dimensions. For example,
for d = 4, each received 4-tuple, (R4i−3, R4i−2, R4i−1, R4i)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n/4, has a unique noise term for each of its
four components, but the channel noise variance over all four
dimensions remains uniform.
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The following derivation extends Alice’s message recon-
struction calculation presented in Eq. 1 to d-dimensional vector
spaces, d ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8}, where the multiplication and division
operators are defined. The derivation of the channel noise for
d = 2, 4, 8 is much more rigorous than for d = 1, however,
the procedure can be simplified by applying associative and
distributive algebraic properties that hold true for the complex,
quaternion, and octonion vector spaces. It follows then that
R = MX−1
= (UY)X−1
= (U(X+ Z))X−1
= (UX+UZ)X−1 by right-linearity a(b+ c) = ab+ ac
= UXX−1 +UZX−1 by left-linearity (b+ c)a = ba+ ca
= U+UZX−1 by right-cancellation abb−1 = a
= U+UZ
X∗
||X||2 . (2)
Here, R, M, X, Y, and Z are d-dimensional vectors, and U
is the d-dimensional vector comprised of (−1)Ci components.
For example, for d = 2, U = [(−1)C2i , (−1)C2i−1 ], while for
d = 4, U = [(−1)C4i−3 , (−1)C4i−2 , (−1)C4i−1 , (−1)C4i ]. The
multi-dimensional noise for a virtual BIAWGNC is given by
the term N = (UZX∗)/||X||2, such that R = U + N. The
Cayley-Dickson construction can then be applied to complete
the derivation of the multi-dimensional noise N for d = 2, 4, 8.
Since the noise is uniformly distributed in each dimension,
C can be assumed to be the all-zero codeword, i.e. Ci =
0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n, to further simplify the derivation.
For d = 2, the channel noise of both the real and imaginary
components can be expressed as N2i−1 = aiZ2i−1 + biZ2i
and N2i = aiZ2i − biZ2i−1, where ai = X2i−1 +X2i
X22i−1 +X
2
2i
and bi =
X2i −X2i−1
X22i−1 +X
2
2i
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n/2. It follows
then that the channel noise variance for d = 2 is given by
σ2N(2i−1) = σ
2
N(2i) = (a
2
i + b
2
i )σ
2
Z . The noise derivation for
d = 4 and d = 8 is much longer and not included here.
4) Reconciliation Efficiency: The reverse reconciliation al-
gorithm for the BIAWGNC can be reduced to an asymmetric
Slepian-Wolf source-coding problem with input M and side
information X, where Alice and Bob observe correlated Gaus-
sian sequences X and Y, respectively [57], [63]. Since Alice
must discard (n − k) parity bits from the linear block code
after LDPC decoding, it follows then that the efficiency of the
reverse reconciliation algorithm is given by β = RcodeI(X;Y ) , where
I(X;Y ) is the mutual information between X and Y, and
Rcode is the LDPC code rate defined as Rcode = k/n from the
n-length codeword C and k-length random information string
S [32], [63]. The mutual information I(X;Y ) corresponds
to the Shannon capacity of the quantum channel, hence the
reconciliation efficiency can be expressed more simply as:
β =
Rcode
C(s)
=
Rcode
Rmax
, (3)
where C(s) = 12 log2(1 + s) is the Shannon capacity and s
is the SNR of the BIAWGNC. The Shannon capacity defines
the maximum achievable code rate Rmax for a given SNR, and
thus, the β-efficiency characterizes how close the reconciliation
algorithm operates to this fundamental limit [60].
The reconciliation efficiency plays a crucial role in the
performance of CV-QKD. The β-efficiency at a particular SNR
operating point determines the code rate, and ultimately, the
number of parity bits discarded in each message. Assuming
that the LDPC coding scheme has been optimized for a partic-
ular SNR operating point such that the code rate Rcode is fixed,
the reconciliation efficiency then depends solely on the SNR of
the quantum channel, which is a function of Alice’s coherent-
state modulation variance and the physical transmission losses
in the optical fiber. Hence, for a fixed optical transmission
distance between Alice and Bob, the reconciliation efficiency
can be optimized by tuning Alice’s modulation variance VA,
and designing an optimal error-correction scheme for a target
SNR. Sections III and IV explore how changes in the β-
efficiency affect the reconciliation distance and maximum
achievable secret key rate.
D. Privacy Amplification
Since Eve may have collected sufficient information during
her observations of the quantum and classical channels, Alice
and Bob must asymptotically reduce Eve’s knowledge of the
key by independently applying a shared universal hashing
function on a concatenated block of their independent binary
strings Sˆ and S, in order to generate a unique symmetric
key [38], [48]. Alice first discards her erroneously decoded
Sˆ messages, and informs Bob as to which messages she
discarded. Bob then discards his original S messages that
correspond to the Sˆ messages that were discarded by Alice.
Alice concatenates all of her correctly decoded Sˆ messages
to construct a long secret key block of length Nprivacy = mk
bits, where k is the length of the LDPC-decoded message Sˆ,
and m is some large non-zero integer. Bob also concatenates
his corresponding S messages to construct a long secret key,
also of length Nprivacy bits. Alice and Bob then independently
perform universal hashing on their independent secret key
blocks to reduce Eve’s knowledge of the key. Alice and
Bob can use the resulting symmetric key to encrypt and
decrypt messages with perfect secrecy using the one-time pad
technique [3].
The speed of privacy amplification is an active area of
research, with published results showing maximum speeds of
100Mb/s for a block size of Nprivacy = 108 bits [64]. The
computational complexity of universal hashing can be reduced
from O(n2) to O(n log2 n) by applying the fast Fourier
transform (FFT) or number theoretical transform (NTT) on
a Toeplitz matrix [65]. Estimation of security parameters is
also performed during privacy amplification using (Nquantum−
Nprivacy) bits, however, a complete discussion of parameter
estimation and privacy amplification is beyond the scope of
this work.
E. Maximizing Secret Key Rate with Collective Attacks
The primary metric that defines the performance of a QKD
system is the maximum rate at which Alice and Bob can
securely generate and reconcile keys over a fixed-distance
optical fiber in the presence of an eavesdropper that has access
to both the quantum and classical channels. The maximum
secret key rate must be proven secure against a collective
Gaussian attack, the most optimal man-in-the-middle attack,
where Eve first prepares an ancilla state to interact with each
one of Alice’s coherent states during the quantum transmission,
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and then listens to the public communication between Alice
and Bob during the reconciliation step in order to perform
the most optimal measurement on her collected ancillae to
reconstruct the classical messages transmitted by Bob [38].
Assuming perfect error-correction during the reconciliation
step, the maximum theoretical secret key rate for a CV-QKD
system with one-way reverse reconciliation can be defined as
Kopt = βIAB − χBE (bits/pulse), (4)
where IAB is the mutual information between Alice and Bob,
β is the previously defined reconciliation efficiency, and χBE
is the Holevo bound on the information leaked to Eve. Here,
IAB is equivalent to the Shannon channel capacity, and is
defined as
IAB =
1
2
log2(1 + s) =
1
2
log2
(
V + χtotal
1 + χtotal
)
, (5)
where V = VA + 1, VA is Alice’s adjustable modulation
variance, and χtotal is the total noise between Alice and Bob.
The Holevo bound is defined as
χBE = G
(
λ1 − 1
2
)
+G
(
λ2 − 1
2
)
−G
(
λ3 − 1
2
)
−G
(
λ4 − 1
2
)
, (6)
where G(x) = (x + 1) log2(x + 1) − x log2 x, and the
Eigenvalues λ1,2,3,4 are given by λ21,2 =
1
2 (A ±
√
A2 − 4B)
and λ23,4 =
1
2 (C ±
√
C2 − 4D), where
A = V 2(1− 2T ) + 2T + T 2(V + χline)2
B = T 2(V χline + 1)
2
C =
V
√
B + T (V + χline) +Aχhom
T (V + χtotal)
D =
√
B
V +
√
Bχhom
T (V + χtotal)
.
Here, Kopt represents the asymptotic limit on the secret key
rate based on ideal theoretical security models, and does not
consider the imperfections of a practical CV-QKD system,
which might enable additional side-channel attacks [66]. Such
imperfections include the finite-size effects [67]–[69], excess
electronic and phase noise from uncalibrated optical equip-
ment, as well as discretized Gaussian modulation with finite
bounds on the distribution and randomness [66]. Leverrier
proved that CV-QKD with coherent states provides composable
security against collective attacks [70], however, extending the
information-theoretic security proofs from collective attacks
to general attacks in the finite-size regime of CV-QKD is
currently an active area of research [69], [71]. At the time
of writing, the highest CV-QKD key rates can be achieved
using coherent states and homodyne detection with security
against collective attacks and some finite-size effects [28]. The
motivation of this work is to show that the key reconciliation
(error correction) algorithm can be accelerated such that the
throughput of LDPC decoding is higher than the asymptotic
secret key rate achievable using realistic quantum channel
parameters and optical equipment available today. The finite-
size effects on secret key rate are considered later in this
section, while the other imperfections of a practical CV-QKD
system are beyond the scope of this work.
Optimizing Alice’s modulation variance for each quantum
transmission distance ensures a maximum SNR on the BI-
AWGNC [32], and thus, a maximum achievable secret key
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β = 0.8 to β = 0.99 based on the optimal VA. The fundamental
limit for a lossy channel is defined by Klim = − log2(1− T ).
rate Kopt for a particular β-efficiency. Figure 4 presents the
optimal modulation variance VA as a function of β for quantum
transmission distances up to 180km, assuming perfect error-
correction in the reconciliation step. Figure 5 shows the
corresponding maximum theoretical secret key rate Kopt for
CV-QKD based on the computed optimal VA at each distance.
Pirandola et al. recently showed that there exists an upper
bound on the secret key rate for a lossy channel [41]. This
fundamental limit is determined by the transmittance T of the
fiber-optic channel, and is given by
Klim = − log2(1− T ) (bits/pulse). (7)
The transmittance was previously defined as T = 10−αd/10,
where the distance d is expressed in kilometers and the stan-
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dard loss of a fiber optic cable is assumed to be α = 0.2dB/km.
The upper bound is plotted in Fig. 5.
The BIAWGNC model for long-distance CV-QKD under
investigation in this work has also been proven secure against
collective attacks, thus the expression for the asymptotic secret
key rate Kopt still holds [32], [51]. At long distances, IAB and
χBE are nearly equal, thus in order to maximize the secret
key rate, it would appear that the reconciliation efficiency
β must also be maximized. However, this is not necessarily
true since Kopt only provides an expression for the maximum
achievable secret key rate and does not consider the speed
of reconciliation, nor the uncorrectable errors. The frame
error rate (FER) of the reconciliation algorithm must also be
considered.
F. Frame Error Rate for Reverse Reconciliation
In reverse reconciliation, Alice attempts to construct a
decoded estimate Sˆ of Bob’s original message S in order to
perform privacy amplification and build a secret key. The tree
diagram in Fig. 6 highlights four possible decoding scenarios
for generating Sˆ from Alice’s decoded codeword Cˆ.
Decoded Codeword Cˆ
CˆH> = 0
Parity Check Pass
Cˆ Valid
CRC Pass
Sˆ = S
No Error
Sˆ 6= S
Undetected
Error
CRC Fail
Sˆ 6= S
Detected
Error
CˆH> 6= 0
Parity Check Fail
Cˆ Error
Skip CRC
Sˆ 6= S
Detected
Error
Fig. 6: Possible decoding scenarios and error detection techniques.
After LDPC decoding, Alice performs a parity check CˆH>
to validate that her decoded codeword Cˆ is valid. When the
parity check fails, i.e. CˆH> 6= 0, Alice knows that a decoding
error has occurred and the frame is discarded since it can not
be used to generate a secret key. However, when the parity
check passes, i.e. CˆH> = 0, Alice knows that Cˆ is a valid
codeword, however, she does not yet know if Cˆ is equal to
Bob’s original encoded codeword C.
For any binary linear block code, the number of possible
codewords is 2k = 2nRcode . Thus, for codes with a long
block-length n, the number of possible codewords grows
exponentially, and it is possible for the decoder to converge to
a valid codeword where the decoded message is incorrect, i.e.
Sˆ 6= S. In coding theory, this is referred to as an undetected
error. This scenario is problematic for secret key generation
where both parties must share the same message after decoding
in order to perform universal hashing in the next privacy
amplification step.
In order to detect invalid decoding errors when CHˆ> = 0,
a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) of Bob’s original message
S can be transmitted as part of the frame, and then verified
against the computed CRC of Alice’s decoded message Sˆ.
Figure 7 presents the components of an LDPC-encoded frame,
Message CRC Parity (Redundancy)
k n-k
NCRCk-NCRC
n
Fig. 7: LDPC frame components: message, CRC, and parity bits.
where k information bits are comprised of (k−NCRC) message
bits and NCRC CRC bits, followed by (n−k) parity bits to be
discarded after LDPC decoding. If the CRC results of S and
Sˆ are equal, then the decoding is successful and Sˆ can be used
to distill a secret key, otherwise Alice knows that a decoding
error has occurred and Sˆ is discarded. The CRC needs to be
performed only when the parity check passes, otherwise the
frame is known to contain an error and the CRC is skipped. A
truly undetected error occurs when both the parity check and
CRC pass, but Sˆ 6= S.
A frame error is said to have occurred when Sˆ 6= S, i.e.
when the decoding fails to reproduce the original message.
Both detected and undetected errors contribute to the overall
FER. The probability of frame error is defined as follows:
Pe = Pdetected error + Pundetected error. (8)
From Fig. 6, it follows then that the detected and undetected
error probabilities are defined as
Pdetected error = P (CˆH
> 6= 0) + P (CˆH> = 0 ∩ CRC Fail)
Pundetected error = P (CˆH
> = 0 ∩ CRC Pass ∩ Sˆ 6= S).
There exists a rare case not shown in Fig. 6, where the parity
check passes and CRC fails, yet Sˆ = S. Although the decoded
message is correct, it will be discarded by the decoder due
to the failed CRC check. As a result, there is a rare chance
that this frame will be lost and the secret key rate will be
reduced. However, this case is not considered by convention
in communication theory.
G. Impact of Reconciliation Error and Efficiency on Key Rate
The remainder of this work investigates the trade-offs in
error-correction performance, reconciliation efficiency, recon-
ciliation distance, and secret key rate, by assuming that the
physical parameters of the quantum channel are fixed, and that
Alice’s modulation variance VA has been optimally set for each
transmission distance and desired β-efficiency. In practice, the
asymptotic secret key rate Kopt is scaled by the FER since
decoded frames with known error can not be used to generate
a secret key and must therefore be discarded. As such, the
effective secret key rate of a practical CV-QKD system is given
by
Keff =
(
1− Pdetected error
)(
(1− Pundetected error)βIAB − χBE
)
. (9)
Alice and Bob can discard frames with detected error, while
frames with undetected error further reduce the mutual in-
formation IAB between Alice and Bob. In Section III, it is
empirically shown that Pundetected error = 0 using a 32-bit CRC
code, thus the total decoding FER can be expressed more
simply as Pe = Pdetected error. This simplified expression for
the FER is assumed for the remainder of this work, and thus
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the effective secret key rate expression given by Eq. 9 can be
reduced to
Keff = (1− Pe)(βIAB − χBE). (10)
Up until this point, the β-efficiency has been assumed
to be independent of the reconciliation algorithm, however,
as shown in Eq. 9, the effective secret key rate Keff is
dependent on both β and FER. Given the set of optimal VA
values and assuming that the physical operating parameters of
the quantum channel remain constant, the virtual BIAWGNC
channel can be induced and described solely in terms of the
SNR at a particular distance with an effective secret key rate
Keff. As described further in Section III, there exists a trade-off
between reconciliation distance and effective secret key rate,
such that for a single SNR, one of the following two operating
conditions is possible: (1) long distance with a low secret key
rate, or (2) short distance with a high secret key rate. In fact,
for a fixed LDPC code rate Rcode, the SNR only depends on
the reconciliation efficiency and is independent of transmission
distance. From Eq. 3, the SNR of a virtual BIAWGNC can be
expressed as a function of β such that
s(β) = 22Rcode/β − 1. (11)
From a code design perspective then, an optimal rate Rcode
LDPC code can be designed to achieve a target FER at a
particular SNR. Since Alice and Bob remain stationary once
deployed in the field, their transmission distance remains fixed,
and thus an optimal LDPC code can be designed to achieve the
maximum operating secret key rate over a range of distances
by providing the optimal trade-off between β and FER.
H. Secret Key Rate with Finite-Size Effects
The security of the CV-QKD protocol must account for
the finite length of the secret key, which is generated via
universal hashing in the privacy amplification step using a
block of length of Nprivacy bits. Alice constructs her privacy
amplification block from her correctly decoded Sˆ messages,
while Bob constructs his privacy amplification block from his
original corresponding S messages. Due to the finite block
size, the secret key rate is reduced by an offset coefficient
∆(Nprivacy) and scaling coefficient Nprivacy/Nquantum, where
Nquantum is the number of symbols sent from Alice to Bob
during the first quantum transmission step. The secret key rate,
accounting for finite-size effects, is given by
Kfinite =
(
Nprivacy
Nquantum
)(
1− Pe
)(
βIAB − χBE −∆(Nprivacy)
)
. (12)
Leverrier et al. showed that Nquantum can be arbitrarily chosen
as Nquantum = 2Nprivacy [67], and that when Nprivacy > 104, the
finite-size offset factor ∆(Nprivacy) can be approximated as
∆(Nprivacy) ≈ 7
√
log2(2/)
Nprivacy
, (13)
where a conservative choice for the security parameter is  =
10−10 [67]. The LDPC block length n is not directly included
in this expression, however, the LDPC block length does affect
the reconciliation efficiency β and FER Pe. The impact of β
and Pe on reconciliation distance is discussed in greater detail
in the next section of this paper.
The next section presents a study of the optimal block
size Nprivacy for privacy amplification, as well as an overview
of the design and application of LDPC codes for reverse
reconciliation in long-distance CV-QKD systems on the virtual
BIAWGNC.
III. LDPC CODES FOR RECONCILIATION
The design of efficient reconciliation algorithms is one
of the central challenges of long-distance CV-QKD [32].
Early reconciliation algorithms failed to achieve efficiencies
above 80% [72], while more advanced algorithms that now
achieve 95% efficiency suffer from computational complex-
ity [25], [28]. LDPC codes are highly suitable for low-SNR
reconciliation in CV-QKD due to their near-Shannon limit
error-correction performance and absence of patent licensing
fees [60]. However, designing efficient LDPC codes with block
lengths on the order of 106 bits remains a challenge.
This section introduces a complexity-reduction technique for
LDPC code design that has been widely adopted in hardware-
based LDPC decoders, namely through the implementation of
architecture-aware codes [73]. A popular class of such codes
are quasi-cyclic codes, whose parity-check matrices are con-
structed from an array of cyclically-shifted identity matrices
that provide a sufficient degree of randomness and enable
computational decoding speedup as a result of their highly
parallelizable structure, which provides a simple mapping to
hardware [40], [73]. Previous independent works by Martinez-
Mateo and Walenta have explored the application of existing
QC-LDPC codes from the IEEE 802.11n standard for DV-
QKD, however, these works were not able to demonstrate
reliable reconciliation beyond 50km [26], [74]. While this
distance may have been a limitation of DV-QKD, the short
block lengths of such existing QC-LDPC codes (on the order
of 103 bits) remain unsuitable for long-distance CV-QKD.
Recently, Bai et al. theoretically showed that rate 0.12 QC
codes with block lengths of 106 bits can be constructed using
progressive edge growth techniques, or by applying a QC
extension to random LDPC codes with block lengths of 105
bits [75]. However, the reported QC codes target an SNR
of -1dB, and are thus not suitable for long-distance CV-
QKD beyond 100km. At the time of writing, there has not
been any reported investigation of the construction of QC
codes for multi-edge LDPC codes targeting low-SNR channels
below -15dB for long-distance CV-QKD. This work shows
that by applying the structured QC-LDPC code construction
technique to the random multi-edge LDPC codes previously
explored by Jouguet et al. for long-distance CV-QKD [32],
it is possible to construct codes that achieve sufficient error-
correction performance while enabling the acceleration of the
computationally-intensive LDPC decoding algorithm such that
the reconciliation step is no longer the bottleneck for secret
key distillation beyond 100km.
As previously described, there exists a trade-off between
reconciliation distance and maximum secret key rate for a
given β-efficiency. Once the target FER and operating SNR
are known, an optimal LDPC code, i.e. parity-check matrix
H, can be designed independent of other CV-QKD system
parameters. The reverse reconciliation problem can thus be
reduced to the simpler model shown in Fig. 8 as a result
of the BIAWGNC approximation at low SNR. The variables
shown in Fig. 8 are the same variables described in Section II,
where S is Bob’s random binary sequence, C is Bob’s binary
LDPC-encoded codeword, the Gaussian channel is described
by Z ∼ N (0, σ2Z), R is Alice’s received channel value, X is
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Fig. 8: Simplified model of BIAWGNC with LDPC encoding and
decoding.
Alice’s correlated Gaussian sequence, and Sˆ is Alice’s LDPC-
decoded estimate of Bob’s original random binary sequence.
Alice and Bob also share a predefined parity-check matrix H
for encoding and decoding.
This work demonstrates the application of multi-edge QC-
LDPC codes for long-distance CV-QKD through the design
of several rate 0.02 binary parity-check matrices with block
lengths on the order of 106 bits. While a complete QKD sys-
tem would offer multi-rate code programmability for various
operating channels, this work focuses on the design of a single,
low-rate code for a large range of transmission distances to
fully study the effects of β-efficiency and FER on the max-
imum achievable secret key rate and reconciliation distance.
While some works have explored the use of rate-adaptive
or repetition codes to achieve high-efficiency decoding with
multiple code rates [32], the exploration of multi-rate code
design for long-distance CV-QKD is beyond the scope of this
work. The remainder of this section describes the construction
of LDPC codes, the belief propagation decoding algorithm, the
error-correction performance of the designed rate 0.02 codes,
and the achievable secret key rates for multiple β-efficiencies
beyond 100km.
A. General Construction of LDPC Codes
LDPC codes are a class of linear block codes defined by a
sparse parity-check matrix H of size (n− k)× n, k ≤ n, and
code rate Rcode = k/n [76]. Given H, an equivalent definition
of the code is given by its Tanner graph [77]. A Tanner
graph G is a bipartite graph with two independent vertex sets,
known as check nodes (CNs) and variable nodes (VNs), which
correspond to the rows and columns of H, respectively. As
shown in Fig. 9, an edge between VN vi and CN cj belongs
to G if and only if H(j, i) = 1.
v1 VN2 VN3 VN4 VN5 VN6
c1 c2 CN3
Check Nodes
Variable Nodes











010101
101010
001011
H
Binary Parity-Check Matrix
v2 v3 v4 v5 v6
c2 c3
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6
c1
c2
c3
k
n
n-k
Fig. 9: LDPC Tanner graph and corresponding binary parity-check
matrix.
An LDPC code of length n is fully specified by the
number of variable and check nodes, and their respective
degree distributions. The number of edges connected to a
vertex in G is called the degree of the vertex. The degree
distribution of G is a pair of polynomials ω(x) = ∑i ωixi
and ψ(x) =
∑
i ψix
i, where ωi and ψi respectively denote
the number of variable and check nodes of degree i in G.
The performance of tree-like Tanner graphs can be analyzed
using a technique called density evolution [59]. As n → ∞,
the error-correction performance of Tanner graphs with the
same degree distribution is nearly identical [59]. Hence, the
variable and check node degree distributions can be normalized
to Ω(x) =
∑
i
ωi
n x
i and Ψ(x) =
∑
i
ψi
n−kx
i, respectively.
The design of binary LDPC codes of rate Rcode and block
length n consists of a two-step process. First, find the nor-
malized degree distribution pair (Ω(x),Ψ(x)) of rate Rcode
with the best performance. Then, if n is large, randomly
sample a Tanner graph G that satisfies the degree distribution
defined by ω(x) and ψ(x) (up to rounding error), and find
the corresponding parity-check matrix H. Unfortunately, this
method is non-trivial in the design of low-rate codes that
approach Shannon capacity at low SNR.
B. Multi-Edge LDPC Codes
Multi-edge LDPC codes, first introduced by Richardson and
Urbanke, provide two advantages over standard LDPC codes:
(1) near-Shannon capacity error-correction performance for
low-rate codes, and (2) low error-floor performance for high-
rate codes [39]. The latter is not a significant concern for long-
distance CV-QKD where the reconciliation FER is on the order
of 10−1, however, the design of a high-performance low-rate
code is crucial to achieving high β-efficiency [32].
The multi-edge framework can be applied to both regular
and irregular LDPC codes with uniform and non-uniform ver-
tex degree distributions, respectively, by introducing multiple
edge types into the Tanner graph specifying the code [39]. In a
standard LDPC code, the polynomial degree distributions are
limited to a single edge type, such that all variable and check
nodes are statistically interchangeable. In order to improve
performance, multi-edge LDPC codes extend the polynomial
degree distributions to multiple independent edge types with
an additional edge-type matching condition [39].
To describe the design of multi-edge LDPC codes, let the
potential connections of a variable or check node be called
its sockets. Let the vector d = (d1, d2, . . . , dt) be a multi-
edge node degree of t types. A node of degree d has d1
sockets of type 1, d2 sockets of type 2, etc. When generating a
Tanner graph, only sockets of the same type can be connected
by an edge of that type. Multi-edge normalized degree dis-
tributions are straightforward generalizations based on multi-
edge degrees Ω(x1, x2, . . . , xt) =
∑
d Ωdx
d1
1 x
d2
2 · · ·xdtt and
Ψ(x1, x2, . . . , xt) =
∑
d Ψdx
d1
1 x
d2
2 · · ·xdtt , where Ωd1,d2,...,dt
and Ψd1,d2,...,dt are the respective fractions of variable and
check nodes with d1 edges of type 1, d2 edges of type 2,
etc. The rate of a multi-edge LDPC code is then defined as
Rcode = Ω(1) − Ψ(1), where 1 denotes the all-ones vector
with implied length [39].
The multi-edge LDPC code used in this work is rate 0.02
with normalized degree distribution
Ω(x1, x2, x3) =
9
400
x21x
57
2 x
0
3 +
7
400
x31x
57
2 x
0
3 +
24
25
x01x
0
2x
1
3
Ψ(x1, x2, x3) =
3
320
x31x
0
2x
0
3 +
17
1600
x71x
0
2x
0
3
+
3
5
x01x
2
2x
1
3 +
9
25
x01x
3
2x
1
3.
This degree distribution was designed by Jouguet et al. by
modifying a rate 1/10 multi-edge degree structure introduced
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by Richardson and Urbanke [32], [39]. Structurally, the sub-
graph induced by edges of type 1 corresponds to a high-rate
LDPC code with variable degree 3 and check degree 7 or
8. Parity checks are added to this code, each checking two
or three variable nodes as specified by edges of type 2. The
resulting parity bits are degree-1 variable nodes specified by
edges of type 3. For the BIAWGNC, the minimum SNR for
which the tree-like Tanner graph with this multi-edge degree
distribution is error free is 2.863× 10−2 or -15.47dB [32].
The LDPC parity-check matrices in this work were gener-
ated by randomly sampling Tanner graphs that satisfied the
multi-edge degree distribution defined by ω(x) and ψ(x),
and the edge-type matching condition. The random sampling
technique does not degrade code performance in this case,
since the operating FER is known to be high (Pe ≈ 10−1). At
such high FER, the error-floor phenomenon is not a significant
concern as the code is strictly designed to operate in the
waterfall region in order to achieve high β-efficiency [78]. The
rate 0.02 LDPC codes explored in this work target a block
length of n = 1 × 106 bits in order to achieve near-Shannon
capacity error-correction performance. As a result, the parity-
check matrix H has dimensions n − k = n(1 − Rcode) =
9.8× 105 by n = 1× 106. Due to the low code rate and large
block length, the random parity-check matrix construction does
introduce LDPC decoder implementation complexity, which
directly affects decoding latency and maximum achievable
secret key rate. The LDPC decoder implementation complexity
for such a code can be reduced with minimal degradation
in error-correction performance by imposing a quasi-cyclic
structure to the parity-check matrix.
C. Quasi-Cyclic LDPC Codes
While purely-random LDPC codes have been shown to
achieve near-Shannon capacity error-correction performance
under belief propagation decoding [79], the hardware-based
implementation of decoders for random codes is a challenge
with large block lengths, especially on the order of 106 bits.
The bottleneck stems from the complex interconnect network
between CN and VN processing units that execute the belief
propagation algorithm [45], [46].
In a traditional LDPC decoder, variable and check node pro-
cessing units iteratively exchange messages across an intercon-
nect network described by a Tanner graph, as shown in Fig. 9.
Purely-random parity-check matrices introduce unstructured
interconnect between the variable and check nodes, resulting in
unordered memory access patterns and complex routing, which
limit scalability in ASIC or FPGA implementations. Quasi-
cyclic codes alleviate such decoder complexities by imposing
a highly-regular matrix structure with a sufficient degree of
randomness [40]. This work extends the design of low-rate,
mutli-edge LDPC codes to QC codes for hardware realization.
QC codes are defined by a parity-check matrix constructed
from an array of q × q cyclically-shifted identity matrices or
q × q zero matrices [40]. As shown in Fig. 10, the tilings
evenly divide the (n − k) × n parity-check matrix H into
n/q QC macro-columns and (n − k)/q QC macro-rows. The
expansion factor q in a QC parity-check matrix determines
the trade-off between decoder implementation complexity and
error-correction performance. For small q, the parity-check
matrix exhibits a high degree of randomness, which improves
error-correction performance, while a large q reduces decoder
complexity with some performance degradation.
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Fig. 10: Sample quasi-cyclic binary parity-check matrix for q = 5
constructed from uniformly-sized (q × q), cyclically-shifted identity
matrices and all-zero matrices.
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Fig. 11: Structure of designed parity-check matrices.
To design a multi-edge QC-LDPC code, repeat the random
multi-edge sampling process using n/q as the block length
instead of n to obtain a base Tanner graph GB . The base parity-
check matrix HB is obtained from GB by populating each non-
zero entry by a random element of the set {1, 2, . . . , q}. Let
Ii be the circulant permutation matrix obtained by cyclically
shifting each row of the q × q identity matrix to the right by
i−1. The QC parity-check matrix H is obtained from HB by
replacing each non-zero entry of value i by Ii, and each zero
entry by the q × q all-zeros matrix.
In this work, multi-edge QC-LDPC parity-check matri-
ces of rate 0.02 were generated for expansion factors q ∈
{21, 50, 100, 500, 1000}. Under belief propagation decoding,
the error-correction performance of the q ∈ {100, 500, 1000}
QC codes was significantly worse in comparison to a random
multi-edge code with the same degree distribution. Thus, only
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the q ∈ {21, 50} codes are presented in the remainder of this
study. In order to maintain the same degree distributions, the
block length for the q = 21 code with rate Rcode = 0.02 was
adjusted to n = 1.008×106 bits. Similarly, the q = 50 code has
a block length of n = 1× 106 bits and rate Rcode = 0.01995.
Figure 11 shows the structure of the parity-check matrices
designed in this work. Both the purely-random and QC matri-
ces have a similar structure, which contains a dense area of 1s
or cyclic identity matrices on the left, and a long diagonal of
degree-1 VNs to the right. The starting point of the diagonal
is determined by the VN degree distribution of the multi-
edge matrix. In the case of the QC codes, no cyclic shifts are
implemented along the diagonal, thus all submatrices are q×q
I1 identity matrices. This matrix structure greatly improves the
decoding speed as degree-1 VNs along the diagonal need to
pass VN-to-CN messages only in the first decoding iteration,
while CN-to-VN messages need to be passed to degree-1 VNs
only if the early-termination condition is enabled. The degree-
1 VNs along the diagonal correspond to the majority (but not
all) of the (n−k) parity bits that are discarded after decoding,
thus the VN update computation needs to be performed in these
degree-1 VNs only if a decision needs to be made when early
termination is enabled. A small fraction of the (n− k) parity
bits correspond to VNs with more than one CN connection
in the denser area of the matrix to the left of the diagonal.
These VNs must perform the VN update computation in each
iteration along with the first k VNs, which correspond to the
k information bits of the block.
The parity component of H, i > k in H(j, i), is lower-
triangular for both the purely-random and QC parity-check
matrices designed in this study. An example of this type
of construction is shown in Fig. 10, and is also illustrated
in Fig. 11. While the lower-triangular construction does not
necessarily impact decoding complexity or error-correction
performance, it does simplify the LDPC encoding procedure,
which can be performed via forward substitution if H is of
this form. Further investigation of LDPC encoding complexity
for such large codes is beyond the scope of this work.
D. LDPC Decoding: Belief Propagation Algorithm
LDPC decoding is performed using belief propagation, an
iterative message-passing algorithm commonly used to per-
form inference on graphical models such as factor graphs [80].
In the context of LDPC, the decoding procedure attempts
to converge on a valid codeword by iteratively exchanging
probabilistic updates between variable and check nodes along
the edges of the Tanner graph until the parity-check condition
is satisfied or the maximum number of iterations is reached.
The Sum-Product algorithm is the most common variant of
belief propagation [80], and is described in Algorithm 1 for
d = 1 dimensional reconciliation on a BIAWGNC.
In Algorithm 1, Step 1 prepares the Qv log-likelihood ratio
(LLR) input values at each variable node based on Alice’s
correlated Gaussian sequence X and the channel noise variance
σ2Z . All VN-to-CN messages from VN v are initialized to
the received channel LLR Qv before the first message-passing
iteration. As previously discussed in Section II, the expression
for the channel noise variance σ2Nv is different for d = 2, 4, 8
reconciliation schemes, but the remainder of the algorithm is
the same. Steps 2 to 5 specify the message-passing interaction
between the CNs and VNs until the codeword syndrome de-
fined by CˆH> is equal to zero, or the maximum predetermined
Algorithm 1 Sum-Product algorithm for d = 1 scheme
Input: X,R, σ2Z ; Output: Sˆ
Step 1: LLR initialization at each VN, v = 1, 2, . . . , n
σ2Nv ←
σ2Z
||Xv|| , Qv ← ln
(
P (Cv = 0|Rv)
P (Cv = 1|Rv)
)
=
2Rv
σ2Nv
L
(t=0)
vc ← Qv , ∀c ∈M(v) for first iteration
for Iteration t = 1 to Max Iterations do
Step 2: Check node update (CN-to-VN messages)
sgn(m
(t)
cv )←∏v′∈N(c)\v sgn(L(t−1)v′c )∣∣m(t)cv ∣∣← Φ−1(∑v′∈N(c)\v Φ(∣∣L(t−1)v′c ∣∣))
m
(t)
cv ← sgn(m(t)cv )×
∣∣m(t)cv ∣∣
Step 3: Variable node update (VN-to-CN messages)
L
(t)
vc ← Qv +
∑
c′∈M(v)\cm
(t)
c′v
L
(t)
v ← Qv +
∑
c∈M(v)m
(t)
cv
Step 4: Hard decision and early termination check
Cˆ
(t)
v ←
0, L
(t)
v ≥ 0
1, otherwise
if CˆH> = 0 (mod 2) then Go to Step 5
end for
Step 5: Discard parity bits Sˆv ← Cˆv, v ≤ k
number of decoding iterations is reached. In Step 2, m(t)cv is
the message from CN c to VN v in iteration t, and Φ(x) =
Φ−1(x) = − ln(tanh(x/2)). In Step 3, L(t)vc is the message
from VN v to CN c, and L(t)v is the updated LLR belief of
bit v in the frame, whose decision is given by Cˆ(t)v in Step
4. In Step 2, the set of VNs connected to CN c is defined as
N(c) = {v|v ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} ∧Hvc = 1}, where the notation
v′ ∈ N(c)\v refers to all VNs in the set N(c) excluding VN
v. Similarly, in Step 3, the set of CNs connected to VN v is
defined as M(v) = {c|c ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n−k}∧Hvc = 1}, where
c′ ∈M(v)\c refers to all CNs in the set M(v) excluding CN
c. As previously described, LDPC decoding is successful if
the decoded message Sˆ is equal to the original message S.
Due to the non-linearity of the tanh(x) function in the
Sum-Product algorithm, most hardware-based LDPC decoders
instead implement variants of the Min-Sum algorithm [45],
[46], which provides an acceptable approximation to Sum-
Product decoding without the need for complex lookup tables.
Despite the benefit of computational speedup, Min-Sum does
not perform well at low SNR [81], and is thus not suitable for
long-distance CV-QKD. The results presented in the remainder
of this work were achieved using Sum-Product decoding.
E. Error-Correction Performance of Multi-Edge QC Codes
The multi-edge LDPC codes designed in this work achieve
similar FER performance on the BIAWGNC compared to those
developed by Jouguet et al. for long-distance CV-QKD with
multi-dimensional reconciliation [32]. Table I summarizes the
parameters of the three codes designed in this work, and
Figures 12 and 13 present their FER vs. SNR error-correction
performance under Sum-Product decoding for d = 1, 2, 4, 8
reconciliation dimensions. FER simulations were performed
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TABLE I: Designed rate 0.02 multi-edge LDPC codes
Structure Expansion Code Rate Block Length (Bits)Factor q Rcode n
Random N/A 0.02 1× 106
Quasi-Cyclic 21 0.02 1.008× 106
Quasi-Cyclic 50 0.01995 1× 106
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d=1 - Random, R=0.02
d=1 - QC, q=21, R=0.02
d=1 - QC, q=50, R=0.01995
d=2 - Random, R=0.02
d=2 - QC, q=21, R=0.02
d=2 - QC, q=50, R=0.01995
Fig. 12: FER vs. SNR for Sum-Product decoding with d = 1 and
d = 2 dimensional reconciliation on BIAWGNC.
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Fig. 13: FER vs. SNR for Sum-Product decoding with d = 4 and
d = 8 dimensional reconciliation on BIAWGNC.
for the complete linear SNR range corresponding to the range
of efficiencies between β = 0.8 and β = 0.99, as defined
by Eq. 11. This range of β-efficiency values was chosen to
illustrate the trade-off between distance and finite secret key
rate. For clarity, however, Figures 12 and 13 present the FER
results only for the SNR range corresponding to β-efficiencies
between β = 0.88 and β = 0.99.
Despite their identical degree distributions, the q = 50 QC
code achieves the best overall FER performance over d =
1, 2, 4, 8 dimensions in comparison to the purely-random and
q = 21 QC codes, due to its slightly lower code rate. At low
SNR where β is high, the q = 21 QC code also performs better
than the purely-random code over all dimensions, likely due
to the longer block length. At higher SNR though, the purely-
random code achieves a lower error-floor than the q = 21 QC
code due to higher randomness in the parity-check matrix.
In general, the d = 2, d = 4, and d = 8 reconciliation
schemes achieve approximately 0.04dB, 0.08dB, and 0.2dB
of coding gain, respectively, over the d = 1 scheme in the
waterfall region for all three codes. As previously mentioned,
FER performance in the waterfall region is of particular
interest for long-distance CV-QKD since it corresponds to the
high β-efficiency region of operation at low SNR close to the
Shannon limit. The error-floor region beyond the waterfall is
not of practical use in CV-QKD as it corresponds to the low
β-efficiency region where transmission distance is limited.
As previously discussed in Section II, for any binary linear
block code, the number of possible codewords is 2k = 2nRcode .
In this case, when n = 1 × 106 bits and Rcode = 0.02, the
number of possible valid codewords for the decoder to choose
from is approximately 4 × 106020. In order to detect invalid
decoding errors when the parity check CˆH> = 0 but Sˆ 6= S,
a 32-bit CRC code is included in each LDPC frame. In this
work, NCRC = 32 bits were sufficient to detect all invalid
decoded messages without sacrificing information throughput.
Having full control of the simulation environment, it was also
empirically found that Pundetected error = 0 using a 32-bit CRC
code.
The probability of an invalid decoding error is given by
P (CˆH> = 0 ∩ CRC Fail) = Number of CRC Errors
Total Number of Frame Errors
.
Figure 14 shows the probability of an invalid decoding error
over the SNR range of interest for d = 1, 2, 4, 8 reconciliation
dimensions on the BIAWGNC for the three LDPC codes
designed in this work. In general, the probability of invalid
decoding increases with SNR and becomes the main source
of frame error, particularly in the error-floor region as a result
of the large block length and low code rate. In the region of
operation for long-distance CV-QKD where the FER Pe ≈ 1,
invalid decoding convergence still contributes to nearly 10%
of all frame errors. A concatenated higher-rate code was not
included as part of the message component to correct residual
errors [32], [38].
Up until this point, the performance of the reconciliation
algorithm has been presented as a coding theory problem,
where an optimal LDPC code was designed to achieve a
particular FER at a given SNR operating point. The SNR was
considered as an abstraction of the virtualized BIAWGNC in
order to demonstrate fixed-rate code performance, independent
of other CV-QKD system parameters such as modulation
variance, transmission distance, and physical losses. Assuming
that the transmission distance and physical parameters of the
quantum channel are fixed, Alice’s modulation variance can
be optimally tuned such that the effective secret key rate is
then solely determined by the FER and β-efficiency of the
LDPC-decoding reconciliation algorithm.
Figure 15 shows that for each fixed-rate LDPC code, there
exists a unique FER-β pair, where each β corresponds to a
14 APRIL 2017
0.028 0.0285 0.029 0.0295 0.03 0.0305 0.031 0.0315 0.032
SNR
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f I
nv
al
id
 D
ec
od
in
g 
Er
ro
r
d=1 - Random
d=1 - QC, q=21
d=1 - QC, q=50
d=2 - Random
d=2 - QC, q=21
d=2 - QC, q=50
d=4 - Random
d=4 - QC, q=21
d=4 - QC, q=50
d=8 - Random
d=8 - QC, q=21
d=8 - QC, q=50
Fig. 14: Probability of invalid decoding error vs. SNR for Sum-
Product decoding with d = 1, 2, 4, 8 dimensional reconciliation on
BIAWGNC. Probability of error is computed for invalid messages
that are correctly decoded but CRC fails.
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Fig. 15: FER vs. reconciliation efficiency for Sum-Product decoding
with d = 1 and d = 8 dimensional reconciliation on BIAWGNC. FER
values are derived from the FER vs. SNR curves based on Eq. 11.
particular SNR operating point based on Eq. 11. While it may
appear from Eq. 10 that maximizing β would produce a higher
effective secret key rate, Fig. 15 shows that β and FER are
positively correlated, such that there exists an optimal trade-
off between β and FER where Keff is maximized for a fixed
transmission distance. To achieve key reconciliation at long
distances, the operating point must be chosen in the waterfall
region where β is high, despite the high FER.
The results presented in this section showed that higher
reconciliation schemes, namely d = 4 and d = 8, extend
code performance to lower SNR where the FER Pe > 0 and
β → 1. As such, the d = 8 scheme would be most preferred
for long-distance reconciliation. The next section examines
the impact of reconciliation dimension, β-efficiency, and FER
on the effective secret key rate over a range of transmission
distances for the LDPC codes designed in this work.
F. Finite Secret Key Rate
This section extends the discussion of the effective secret
key rate to include finite-size effects. Key reconciliation for a
particular β-efficiency is only achievable over a limited range
of distances where the finite secret key rate Kfinite > 0. In
general, for a single FER-β pair, LDPC decoding can achieve
either (1) a high secret key rate at short distance, or (2) a low
secret key rate at long distance. For long-distance CV-QKD
beyond 100km, key reconciliation is only achievable with high
β-efficiency at the expense of low secret key rate. This section
provides an overview of the maximum achievable finite secret
key rates and reconciliation distances for the three LDPC codes
designed in this work. Results are presented for the d = 1 and
d = 8 reconciliation dimensions in order to demonstrate the
effectiveness of higher-order dimensionality on reconciliation
distance. The results also consider the finite size of the privacy
amplification block. The d = 1 and d = 8 secret key rate
results are shown for privacy amplification blocks of Nprivacy =
1010 and Nprivacy = 1012 bits to demonstrate the impact of
block size on the maximum transmission distance.
The range of transmission distances for each β is limited by
the total noise between Alice and Bob. From Eq. 5, the total
noise can be expressed as a function of β, such that
χ′total(β) =
VoptA (β)
s(β)
− 1, (14)
where VoptA (β) is a vector of Alice’s optimal modulation vari-
ances for a particular β-efficiency from Fig. 4, and the virtual
SNR s(β) is given by Eq. 11 for a fixed-rate LDPC code. From
the expression for the total channel noise, χtotal = χline + χhomT ,
a set of transmission distance points for a particular β can then
be described by the vector
d′(β) =
10
α
log10
(
η(χ′total(β)− + 1)
1 + Vel
)
, (15)
in order to compute the maximum theoretical finite secret key
rate based on Eq. 12.
Figures 16 and 17 present the finite secret key rate results
for the three LDPC codes over the transmission distance range
of interest with Nprivacy = 1010 bits based on the d = 1
and d = 8 reconciliation dimensions, respectively. Each β-
efficiency curve in Figures 16 and 17 represents a FER-β
pair where the FER and SNR are constant over the entire
transmission distance range, while VA is optimally chosen to
achieve the maximum secret key rate at each distance point.
When β is high, the FER Pe → 1, and thus Kfinite → 0 as
erroneous frames are discarded after decoding. As a result,
the maximum reconciliation distance is limited by the error-
correction performance of the LDPC code. Figures 18 and 19
present the finite secret key rate results with Nprivacy = 1012
bits over d = 1 and d = 8 reconciliation dimensions,
respectively. When Nprivacy = 1012 bits, the maximum trans-
mission distance is extended by 18km over the result with
Nprivacy = 10
10 bits for d = 8 reconciliation with β = 0.99
efficiency. This demonstrates the importance of selecting a
large block size for privacy amplification.
In each of the Nprivacy = 1010 and Nprivacy = 1012 cases,
the three LDPC codes achieve similar finite secret key rates
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Fig. 16: d = 1 dimensional reconciliation with Nprivacy = 1010
bits: finite secret key rate Kfinite vs. distance for collective attacks
on BIAWGNC with Sum-Product decoding.
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Fig. 17: d = 8 dimensional reconciliation with Nprivacy = 1010
bits: finite secret key rate Kfinite vs. distance for collective attacks
on BIAWGNC with Sum-Product decoding.
and reconciliation distances with both d = 1 and d = 8
schemes for β ≤ 0.92, since the codes are operating close
to their respective error floors. However, for β > 0.92, the
FER becomes a limiting factor to achieving a non-zero secret
key rate. The d = 1 scheme achieves a maximum efficiency of
β = 0.96, where the maximum distance is limited to 124km
with Nprivacy = 1010 bits, and 132km with Nprivacy = 1012 bits.
For β > 0.96, the FER Pe = 1, thus Kfinite = 0. The d = 8
scheme operates up to β = 0.99 efficiency, with a maximum
distance of 142km with Nprivacy = 1010 bits, and 160km with
Nprivacy = 10
12 bits. Furthermore, the d = 8 scheme achieves
higher secret key rates for all three LDPC codes at β = 0.95
and β = 0.96 in comparison to the d = 1 scheme since the
code FER performance is higher. While the complete results
are not shown here, the d = 2 and d = 4 schemes both
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Fig. 18: d = 1 dimensional reconciliation with Nprivacy = 1012
bits: finite secret key rate Kfinite vs. distance for collective attacks
on BIAWGNC with Sum-Product decoding.s
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Fig. 19: d = 8 dimensional reconciliation with Nprivacy = 1012
bits: finite secret key rate Kfinite vs. distance for collective attacks
on BIAWGNC with Sum-Product decoding.
achieve a maximum efficiency of β = 0.97, at 129km with
Nprivacy = 10
10 bits, and 138km with Nprivacy = 1012 bits.
The finite secret key rate Kfinite results presented in this sec-
tion were normalized to the pulse rate, without consideration
of the light source repetition rate frep. By considering the pulse
rate, the complete operating secret key rate of the CV-QKD
system can be defined as
K ′finite = frepKfinite (bits/s). (16)
The next section presents an overview of a GPU-based LDPC
decoder implementation where the information throughput for
the three LDPC codes designed in this work is compared to the
upper bound on secret key rate at the maximum reconciliation
distance points.
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IV. GPU-ACCELERATED LDPC DECODING
GPUs are a highly suitable platform for the implementation
of LDPC decoders that target high information throughput with
long block-length codes. Computational acceleration of the
belief propagation algorithm is achieved by parallelizing the
check and variable node update operations across thousands of
single-instruction multiple-thread (SIMT) cores, which provide
floating-point precision, high-bandwidth read/write access to
on-chip memory, and intrinsic mathematical libraries for the
logarithmic functions of the Sum-Product algorithm [82]–[86].
This section provides an overview of the GPU-based LDPC
decoder implementation in this work. GPU throughput results
are presented for the maximum CV-QKD distances under
d = 1, 2, 4, 8 dimensional reconciliation, and also compared
to the maximum achievable secret key rates for reconciliation
efficiencies β > 0.85. Finally, the implementation is compared
to previous work by Jouguet and Kunz-Jacques for an LDPC
code with block length of 220 bits [25], as well as other
non-LDPC codes. The GPU decoding throughput results pre-
sented in this section quantitatively highlight the computational
speedup that can be achieved using quasi-cyclic LDPC codes
for long-distance CV-QKD.
A. GPU-based LDPC Decoder Implementation
The LDPC decoder was implemented on a single NVIDIA
GeForce GTX 1080 (Pascal Architecture) GPU with 2560
CUDA cores using the NVIDIA CUDA C++ application pro-
gramming interface. Figure 20 shows the data flow for a single
decoding iteration of the parallelized Sum-Product algorithm,
which is comprised of four multi-threaded compute kernels.
Each kernel instantiates a different number of GPU threads
depending on the level of parallelism for the operation. The
individual compute operations of the Sum-Product algorithm
are re-ordered to exploit the maximum amount of thread-level
parallelism in each kernel such that the latency per iteration is
minimized. The overall throughput of the GPU-based LDPC
decoder is then determined by the number of iterations, the
latency per iteration, and the block length.
The complexity of an LDPC decoder implementation stems
from the highly-irregular interconnect structure between CNs
and VNs described by the code’s Tanner graph. For codes
with short block lengths, the permutation network complexity
does not introduce significant GPU decoding latency [82]–[84],
however, for codes with block lengths on the order of 106 bits
as those designed in this work, data permutation and message
passing constitute between 25% to 50% of GPU runtime per
decoding iteration, as shown in Table II. While arithmetic oper-
ations are relatively inexpensive on a GPU, addressing global
memory is very costly in terms of compute time. The most
expensive GPU operation is addressing unordered memory,
i.e. accessing non-consecutive memory locations, as multiple
transactions are required to perform the unordered memory
read or write, and all kernel threads must be stalled [83].
On the contrary, coalesced memory addressing, i.e. accessing
consecutive memory locations, can be performed in a single
transaction and allows for concurrent thread execution, which
reduces the runtime of the kernel. Furthermore, uncoalesced
memory writes are more expensive than uncoalesced memory
reads. Thus, the throughput of a GPU-based LDPC decoder is
highly dependent on memory access patterns.
The operations of the Sum-Product algorithm presented in
Algorithm 1 were re-ordered to avoid uncoalesced memory
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Fig. 20: GPU implementation of LDPC decoder showing four multi-
threaded compute kernels and data flow from top to bottom for one
decoding iteration. Coalesced memory access patterns and message
variables are indicated. Thread i is denoted by ti, where T in kernels
1 and 3 represents the maximum number of connections between all
CNs and VNs, (n − k) in kernel 2 is the number of CNs, and n in
kernel 4 is the number of VNs. Early termination is not shown.
writes and to use the maximum amount of thread-level par-
allelism for arithmetic computations. For example, the VN-
to-CN message-passing permutation in kernel 1 also performs
the Φ(·) computation from the next CN-update step in each
thread. The CN-update kernel (2) does not fully compute
the mcv messages from each CN to its connected VNs, but
instead, the final CN-to-VN mcv messages are computed in
the CN-to-VN message-passing kernel (3). Due to the Tanner
graph structure and data permutation nature of the LDPC
decoder, uncoalesced memory reads are still required when
reading from edge memory in kernel 1 and reading from CN
memory in kernel 3. However, the latency of these operations
is negligible compared to the overall latency of an entire
iteration. Fully-coalesced memory writes are enabled by the
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TABLE II: GPU-based LDPC decoding latency and error-correction
performance for rate 0.02 multi-edge codes
LDPC Code RandomMulti-Edge
q = 21 QC
Multi-Edge
q = 50 QC
Multi-Edge
Block Length (Bits) 1× 106 1.008× 106 1× 106
Code Rate 0.02 0.02 0.01995
Connections in
Parity Matrix 3,337,494 160,185 66,747
Latency by Kernel with Percent Breakdown for 1 Decoding Iteration
Kernel 1 Runtime
VN-to-CN (ms) 1.773 (50.3%) 0.446 (34.4%) 0.391 (33.2%)
Kernel 2 Runtime
CN Update (ms) 0.197 (5.6%) 0.204 (15.7%) 0.198 (16.8%)
Kernel 3 Runtime
CN-to-VN (ms) 1.240 (35.1%) 0.317 (24.4%) 0.303 (25.7%)
Kernel 4 Runtime
VN Update (ms) 0.318 (9.0%) 0.331 (25.5%) 0.286 (24.3%)
Total Latency Per
Iteration (ms) 3.528 1.296 1.177
FER Performance and Decoding Throughput at β = 0.99 and d = 8
Max Iterations 500 500 500
Average Iterations ∗ 470 451 470
FER 0.883 0.792 0.883
KrawGPU Raw
Throughput (Mb/s) 0.603 1.724 1.807
K ′GPU Information
Throughput (Kb/s) 1.409 7.160 4.207
∗ Early-termination check is enabled only after the number of decoding
iterations is equal to the average number of iterations, which is determined
empirically through FER simulation and stored in a lookup table.
different ordering of connected edges in the VN-to-CN and
CN-to-VN message-passing kernels (1 and 3). In the VN-
to-CN message-passing kernel (1), the edge connectivity is
ordered by consecutive VNs, while in the CN-to-VN message-
passing kernel (3), the edges are ordered by consecutive CNs.
Each CN-VN edge in the edge memory has a unique index
that is addressed by both message-passing kernels (1 and 3).
Several additional memory optimizations improve the overall
GPU throughput. Shared memory is used in each thread to
store local variables and to avoid expensive global memory
accesses, while texture caches are used to store frequently-
accessed static variables such as channel LLRs and the parity-
check matrix.
As shown in Fig. 20, message-passing kernels (1 and 3)
instantiate up to T threads, where T is the maximum number
of edge connections between all CNs and VNs, kernel 2
instantiates (n − k) threads equal to the total number of
CNs in the matrix, and kernel 4 instantiates up to n threads
equal to the total number of VNs in the matrix. When early
termination is enabled, T threads are required in kernels 1 and
3, and n threads are required in kernel 4. However, when early
termination is disabled, the number of threads instantiated in
kernels 1, 3, and 4 can be reduced due to the long-diagonal
construction of the parity-check matrices in this work. The
message-passing kernels (1 and 3) need only to instantiate
threads that correspond to the CN-VN connections to the left
of the long diagonal in the matrix structure shown in Fig. 11.
Similarly, the VN-update kernel (4) needs only to instantiate
threads that correspond to VNs to the left of the long diagonal.
This reduction in the number of threads provides a marginal
speedup in each iteration.
While not shown in Fig. 20, the early-termination check
is implemented via multiple kernels that perform a parallel
reduction following the VN-to-CN message-passing kernel
(1) in order to compute the parity at each CN. Additional
computations and memory reads/writes are required in the
message-passing and VN-update kernels (1, 3, and 4). The
following additional operations must be performed to enable an
early-termination check: send the decision bit from each VN to
its connected CNs, send all mcv messages from each CN to its
connected VNs (including those corresponding to connections
along the long diagonal), and calculate the decision bit in
each VN. To reduce overall decoding latency and maximize
throughput, the early-termination check is performed only after
a fixed number of decoding iterations. This fixed number
of iterations corresponds to the average number of iterations
required at each SNR point, and is pre-determined empirically
through FER simulation for each code. The decoder uses a
lookup table to decide after how many decoding iterations to
enable the early-termination check based on the current SNR.
A quasi-cyclic matrix structure reduces data permutation and
memory access complexity by eliminating random, unordered
memory access patterns. In addition, QC codes require fewer
memory lookups for message passing since the permutation
network can be described with approximately q-times fewer
terms, where q is the expansion factor of the QC parity-check
matrix, in comparison to a purely-random matrix for the same
block length. Table II presents a breakdown of the latency of
each GPU kernel for the three LDPC codes designed in this
work. While the CN and VN update kernels (2 and 4) have
similar runtime for both random and QC codes, QC codes
achieve faster runtime in data permutation kernels (1 and 3)
due the approximately q-times fewer CN-VN edge connections
in the parity-check matrix. Since the parity-check matrices
designed in this work are sparse, a compressed data structure
is used to store CN-VN edge connections to reduce memory
read latency in the message-passing kernels.
Table II also highlights the respective error-correction per-
formance and GPU throughput of the three codes at the
maximum β = 0.99 efficiency with d = 8 reconciliation. The
raw GPU throughput (including parity bits) is given by
K rawGPU =
Block Length
Latency Per Iteration× Iterations (bits/s). (17)
Similar to the finite secret key rate, the information throughput
of the GPU decoder must be scaled by (1) the FER Pe to
account for discarded frames when decoding is unsuccessful,
i.e. CRC does not pass or parity check fails, and (2) the code
rate Rcode to account for the parity bits that must be discarded
after decoding. The average GPU information throughput is
then given by
K ′GPU = K
raw
GPU Rcode (1− Pe). (18)
Thus, for any LDPC code, the GPU throughput is determined
by the latency per iteration and the number of decoding
iterations. The latency per iteration depends on the LDPC code
structure and the number of memory lookups, while the FER
is bound by the maximum number of iterations.
Some GPU-based LDPC decoders use fixed-point number
representations and/or frame-level parallelism to maximize
computational speedup for codes with short block lengths
(n < 105 bits) in high-SNR regions above 0dB where the
Min-Sum algorithm achieves sufficient error-correction perfor-
mance [82]–[86]. This work, however, uses single-precision
floating point to minimize FER with Sum-Product decoding at
SNRs below -15dB. Due to the large block length (n = 106
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TABLE III: Overview of secret key rate and GPU throughput at maximum reconciliation distance
with rate 0.02 multi-edge codes and Nprivacy = 1012 bits
Reconciliation
Dimension
Maximum
Reconciliation
Efficiency
LDPC
Code
Maximum
Distance
(km)
Operating Secret
Key Rate K ′finite at
Max Distance with
frep = 1MHz (bit/s)
Fundamental Key
Rate Limit K ′lim at
Max Distance with
frep = 1MHz (Kbit/s)
GPU Raw
Throughput
KrawGPU
(Mbit/s)
GPU Info.
Throughput
K ′GPU
(Kbit/s)
K ′GPU
Speedup
Over K ′lim
(K ′GPU/K ′lim)
d = 1 β = 0.96
Random 131.38 0.060 3.405 0.612 0.111 0.033×
QC, q = 21 131.38 0.119 3.405 1.887 0.686 0.202×
QC, q = 50 131.43 0.235 3.397 1.966 1.426 0.420×
d = 2 β = 0.97
Random 137.99 0.051 2.510 0.612 0.223 0.087×
QC, q = 21 137.99 0.203 2.510 1.856 2.700 1.076×
QC, q = 50 137.85 0.050 2.526 1.983 0.360 0.142×
d = 4 β = 0.97
Random 137.99 0.101 2.510 0.604 0.439 0.175×
QC, q = 21 137.99 0.302 2.510 1.818 3.938 1.569×
QC, q = 50 137.85 0.401 2.526 1.855 2.692 1.065×
d = 8 β = 0.99
Random 160.47 0.230 0.891 0.604 1.409 1.581×
QC, q = 21 160.47 0.410 0.891 1.724 7.160 8.033×
QC, q = 50 160.52 0.224 0.889 1.808 4.207 4.733×
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Fig. 21: Measured information throughput K′GPU vs. reconciliation
efficiency for d = 1 and d = 8 dimensional reconciliation. Each
measurement point corresponds to a particular SNR operating point
with a measured FER presented in Fig. 15.
bits), all GPU threads are fully utilized, thus external (frame-
level) parallelism does not provide additional speedup. Asyn-
chronous data transfer to the GPU is another technique often
employed to minimize overhead latency, however, this does not
provide any significant performance boost as the Sum-Product
computation dominates overall execution time due to the large
number of iterations required for low-SNR decoding.
B. Information Throughput Results
Figure 21 presents the measured information throughput
K ′GPU from the GPU decoder for all three LDPC codes at
each β-efficiency point, which corresponds to a unique SNR-
FER point in Figures 12 and 13 for the d = 1 and d = 8
dimensional reconciliation cases, respectively. Table III com-
pares the performance of the rate 0.02 random and QC codes
at the maximum achievable distance for each reconciliation
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Fig. 22: GPU information throughput K′GPU of the q = 50 QC-LDPC
code with d = 8 dimensional reconciliation up to the maximum
distance point for each β efficiency with Nprivacy = 1012 bits,
maximum CV-QKD key rate with perfect reconciliation (FER = 0)
K′opt, and fundamental secret key rate limit for lossy channel K′lim vs.
distance. K′opt and K′lim are scaled by frep = 1MHz.
dimension. The q = 21 and q = 50 QC codes designed in this
work achieve approximately 3× higher raw decoding through-
put K rawGPU over the purely-random code with d = 1, 2, 4, 8
dimensional reconciliation at the maximum distance point for
each β-efficiency. When scaled by the corresponding FER and
code rate, the QC codes achieve between 5.1× and 12.8×
higher information throughput K ′GPU over the purely-random
code. Table III also presents the operating secret key rate
K ′finite defined by Eq. 16, and the fundamental secret key rate
limit Klim for a lossy channel defined by Eq. 7. Here, the
fundamental limit is scaled by the light source repetition rate
frep, such that
K ′lim = frepKlim. (19)
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A realistic CV-QKD repetition rate of frep = 1MHz is assumed
for the comparison [28], [53], [87]. For distances beyond
130km, the operating secret key rate K ′finite is between 2176×
and 57112× lower than the fundamental limit K ′lim, with d = 8
and d = 1 dimensional reconciliation, respectively.
The rightmost column in Table III (K ′GPU/K
′
lim) presents
the two key results of this work. First, it shows that the
GPU decoder can achieve between 1.07× and 8.03× higher
information throughput K ′GPU over the fundamental secret key
rate limit K ′lim with a 1MHz source using QC-LDPC codes
with d = 4 and d = 8 dimensional reconciliation. Since the
decoder delivers an information throughput higher than the
fundamental key rate limit, it can be concluded that LDPC
decoding is no longer the post-processing bottleneck in CV-
QKD, and thus, the secret key rate remains only limited by the
physical parameters of the quantum channel. The second result
is that d = 1 and d = 2 dimensional reconciliation schemes
are not well-suited for long-distance CV-QKD since the K ′GPU
speedup over K ′lim is less than 1×. In general, Table III shows
that QC codes achieve lower decoding latency than the purely-
random code at long distances, thereby making them more
suitable for reverse reconciliation at high β efficiencies.
The results presented in Table III and Fig. 22 assumed a
light source repetition rate of frep =1MHz. While a higher
source repetition rate such as frep = 100MHz or frep = 1GHz
would raise the fundamental secret key rate limit K ′lim above
the maximum GPU decoder throughput K ′GPU, it would still not
introduce a post-processing bottleneck for CV-QKD. The GPU
decoder currently delivers an information throughput K ′GPU
between 1868× and 18790× higher than the operating secret
key rate K ′finite with a 1MHz light source at the maximum
distance points for d = 1, 2, 4, 8 dimensional reconciliation
schemes beyond 130km. Even with a source repetition rate
of frep = 1GHz, the GPU information throughput K ′GPU
would still exceed the operating secret key rate K ′finite for
distances beyond 130km by 1.8× and 18.7×, assuming the
same quantum channel parameters. Therefore, GPUs remain
a viable platform for the implementation of reconciliation
algorithms for long-distance CV-QKD.
This is further illustrated in Fig. 22 where the GPU in-
formation throughput K ′GPU of the q = 50 QC-LDPC code
with d = 8 dimensional reconciliation is compared to the
asymptotic secret key rate limit Kopt for each β-efficiency with
perfect reconciliation (Pe = 0), as presented in Fig. 5. Here,
a 1MHz source is assumed, and the scaled K ′opt is given by
K ′opt = frepKopt. (20)
The result presented in Fig. 22 also shows that K ′GPU is higher
than the upper bound on secret key rate K ′lim on a lossy channel
with a 1MHz source from β = 0.8 to β = 0.99.
C. Comparison to Other CV-QKD Implementations
While QKD has been well-studied over the past 30 years,
the exploration of long-distance CV-QKD is still nascent, with
very few published implementations in the low-SNR regime
for optical transmission distances beyond 100km. Hardware-
based implementations of DV-QKD and short-distance CV-
QKD have previously been demonstrated using FPGAs and
GPUs [26], [27], [74], [88], however, at the time of writing,
there is only one reported CV-QKD implementation designed
to operate in the low-SNR regime for long-distance reconcili-
ation [25].
TABLE IV: GPU LDPC decoding comparison at SNR = 0.161 with
d = 8 on BIAWGNC targeting FER = 0.04 with rate 1/10 codes
Specification This Work
Jouguet &
Kunz-Jacques
2016 2014 [25]
Code Rate 1/10 1/10
Block Length (Bits) 220 220
SNR 0.161 0.161
LDPC Code
Structure
Random
Multi-Edge
q = 512 QC
Multi-Edge
Random
Multi-Edge
Connections in
Parity Matrix 4,063,229 7,932 N/A
Early Termination No Yes No Yes No
Max Iterations 88 88 100 100 100
Average Iterations 88 78 100 78 100
FER (1) 0.04 0.04 0.0243 0.0243 0.04
Latency Per
Iteration (ms) (2) 4.73 4.84 1.28 1.47 1.48
KrawGPU GPU Raw
Throughput (Mb/s) 2.52 2.78 8.21 9.17 7.1
K ′GPU GPU Info.
Throughput (Kb/s) 242 267 801 895 682
GPU Model NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 AMD RadeonHD 7970
CMOS Technology 16nm 28nm
GPU Cores 2560 2048
GPU GFLOPS 8228 3789
GPU Memory Bus
Width (Bits) 256 384
GPU Memory
Bandwidth (GB/s) 320 264
(1) FER Pe corresponds to the probability of detected error, since
Pundetected = 0 with 32-bit CRC. All three codes achieve a CV-QKD distance
of 83.8km based on the quantum channel parameters assumed in this work.
(2) Latency per iteration is an average for the full decoding of a single
frame, and also includes the data transfer latency between the CPU and
GPU.
Jouguet and Kunz-Jacques reported a GPU-based LDPC
decoder implementation that achieves 7.1Mb/s throughput at
SNR = 0.161 (β = 0.93) on the BIAWGNC [25], for a random
multi-edge LDPC code with a block length of 220 bits based
on the rate 1/10 multi-edge code designed by Richardson and
Urbanke with an SNR threshold of 0.1556 [39]. For throughput
comparison purposes, two additional multi-edge codes with
the same code rate, block length, and SNR threshold were
designed in this work: a purely-random code and a q = 512
QC code.
Table IV presents a performance comparison between the
two designed rate 1/10 codes and the result achieved by
Jouguet and Kunz-Jacques at SNR = 0.161 on the BI-
AWGNC [25]. The two designed codes achieve a FER of
approximately 0.04 under the same decoding conditions as the
comparison work with d = 8 dimensional reconciliation. Simi-
lar to the results presented in Tables II and III, the q = 512 QC
code achieves approximately 3× lower latency per iteration
than the purely-random rate 1/10 code designed in this work.
Rate 1/10 QC codes with expansion factors q ∈ {64, 128, 256}
were also designed, however, the q = 512 QC code achieved
the lowest latency per iteration due to the lower number
of required memory accesses in the GPU message-passing
kernels, as a result of the lower number of connections in the
QC parity-check matrix. While the designed rate 1/10 random
code achieves a maximum raw throughput of only 2.78Mb/s,
the q = 512 QC code delivers a maximum raw throughput
of 9.17Mb/s with early termination enabled only in iterations
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greater than the average number of iterations, as determined
empirically through FER simulation. The q = 512 QC code
achieves a 1.29× higher throughput than the 7.1Mb/s reported
by Jouguet and Kunz-Jacques [25], further demonstrating that
the QC code structure offers computational speedup benefits
for multi-edge codes operating in the high β-efficiency region
at low SNR. Although the comparison work is from 2014,
both GPU models have a similar memory bus width, which is
the primary constraint that limits the latency per iteration. As
previously discussed, GPU decoder performance is bound by
the memory access rate, and not the floating point operations
per second (FLOPS). Thus, a wider GPU memory allows for a
higher memory access rate, which in turn, reduces the decoding
latency.
Other types of error-correcting codes have been studied
for application in the low-SNR regime of CV-QKD, such as
polar codes, repeat-accumulate (RA) codes, and raptor codes.
Polar codes require block lengths on the order of 227 bits
to achieve comparable FER performance to the rate 1/10
multi-edge LDPC codes designed in this work, however, they
have been shown to achieve low decoding latency on generic
x86 CPUs due to their recursive decoding algorithm [25].
A polar-code performance comparison is not available for
the rate 0.02 multi-edge QC-LDPC codes designed in this
work. Punctured and extended low-rate RA codes have been
constructed from ETSI DVB-S2 codes with block lengths
of 64,800 bits to achieve β > 0.85 efficiency over a wide
range of SNRs [89], however, their performance has not been
investigated beyond 70km and there is currently no hardware
implementation to provide a sufficient throughput comparison.
Lastly, raptor codes achieve high β-efficiency at low SNR and
guarantee error-free decoding (Pe = 0) by sending as many
coded symbols as required by the receiver [90]. However,
their decoding latency may be a limitation to high-throughput
reconciliation, and at the time of writing, there is no known
hardware implementation of raptor codes for long-distance CV-
QKD. The demand for long-distance communication through
applications such as CV-QKD motivates the need for continued
research in high-efficiency codes and their hardware realiza-
tions.
V. CONCLUSION
This work introduced multi-edge quasi-cyclic LDPC codes
to accelerate the reconciliation step in long-distance CV-QKD
by means of a GPU-based decoder implementation and multi-
dimensional reconciliation schemes. With an 8-dimensional
reconciliation scheme, the GPU-based decoder delivers an
information throughput up to 8.03× higher than the upper
bound on secret key rate for a lossy channel with a 1MHz
source, thereby demonstrating that key reconciliation is no
longer a computational bottleneck in long-distance CV-QKD.
Furthermore, the low-rate LDPC codes extend the maximum
distance of CV-QKD from the previously achieved 100km to
160km based on the quantum channel parameters assumed in
this work.
The LDPC codes and reconciliation techniques applied in
this work can be extended to post-processing algorithms in
two areas that show promise for the future of QKD: (1)
free-space QKD using low-Earth orbit satellites as commu-
nication relays to extend the distance of secure communi-
cation beyond 200km without fiber-optic infrastructure, and
(2) fully-integrated chip implementations [4]. Recent works
have experimentally demonstrated terrestrial free-space QKD
for distances up to 143km [91], [92], while satellite-based
QKD has been proposed as a practical near-term solution to
achieving long-distance QKD on a global scale [20], [93]. In
August 2016, China launched the Quantum Experiments at
Space Scale (QUESS) satellite to generate secret keys between
ground stations in Beijing and Vienna by transmitting entan-
gled photon pairs from an orbit altitude of 500km [94]. Free-
space fading channels for satellite QKD typically operate at
SNRs above 0dB [95], however, quasi-cyclic code construction
techniques can still be employed to achieve high secret key
rates, while GPUs would allow for simple integration with
other satellite equipment for rapid prototyping, in contrast
to ASIC- or FPGA-based LDPC decoder implementations.
This paper presented the computational speedup achievable
on a single state-of-the-art GPU. Further acceleration can be
achieved through architectural optimizations in the design of
a monolithic QKD chip that combines both optical and post-
processing circuits. Photonic chips have already been realized
for QKD transmitters and receivers [4], [21], [96], [97],
and further integration of post-processing algorithms would
provide a considerable reduction in system size and power
consumption. A final key takeaway here is that the quasi-cyclic
LDPC code construction and GPU architecture techniques
presented in this work can also be applied to forward error-
correction implementations for DV-QKD where reconciliation
is performed over the binary symmetric channel (BSC) instead
of the BIAWGNC as in CV-QKD.
This work addressed the challenge of achieving high-speed,
high-efficiency reconciliation for long-distance CV-QKD over
fiber-optic cable. In addition to extending information-theoretic
security to general attacks for finite key sizes, a major remain-
ing hurdle to extending the secure transmission distance in CV-
QKD is the reduction of excess noise in the optical quantum
channel. While recent techniques have been demonstrated to
control excess noise to within a tolerable limit [29], future
work may also investigate the security of CV-QKD in the
presence of non-Gaussian noise sources, and in particular,
the performance of LDPC decoding at low SNR with non-
Gaussian noise. GPU-based decoder implementations with
quasi-cyclic codes would provide a suitable platform for such
investigations. Furthermore, reducing the latency of privacy
amplification for large block sizes on the order of Nprivacy ≥
1012 bits is necessary in order to realize secret key exchange
for distances beyond 100km.
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